Debates surrounding governance strategies for marine protected areas (MPAs) have to date largely focused on top-down, bottom-up or market-based approaches. Whilst co-management approaches for governing MPAs are widely accepted as a way forward for combining these three strategies, many interpretations of this concept exist and it is applied in many different ways in MPAs in different contexts. This study aimed to explore governance through a case-study approach based on a specifically developed empirical framework -the marine protected area governance (MPAG) analysis framework -to increase understanding of how to combine the three governance approaches. A dialogue with MPA practitioners in 20 case studies helped shape the MPAG analysis framework as it developed, and an international workshop was held on 'Governing MPAs', bringing the practitioners together to compare results and further develop the framework. This paper provides an overview of the topic and research methodology and briefly introduces the case studies further explored in this special issue.
Overview of the marine protected area governance (MPAG) project and its theoretical background
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) defines a marine protected area (MPA) as "a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values" [1] . Whilst the international community continues to push for protected area targets, including the Convention on Biological Diversity's target for 10% of marine areas under national jurisdiction to be protected by the year 2020, a wider and highly important question remains as to whether MPAs are effective in achieving their conservation objectives, and if not, whether and how this failure is related to the way(s) in which they are governed.
Debates on the merits and downfalls of different approaches to governance have evolved with civilisation, and many influential thinkers have put forward arguments concerning the relative importance of top-down (regulation by the state), bottom-up (community-based), and market (economic incentives) approaches. There is a vast literature on the relative merits of these approaches and many definitions of governance. Indeed, the word 'governance' is derived from Plato's use of the Greek verb 'to steer' (The Republic, 360BC), and another way to consider these debates is to examine how different ways of steering human affairs (Table 1) can be combined in order to achieve strategic societal objectives. For the purposes of this project, the following definition of governance was thereby considered most appropriate: "steering human behaviour through combinations of people, state and market incentives in order to achieve strategic objectives". This definition is consistent with the growing recognition in governance debates that there is a need to move beyond ideological arguments as to which approach is 'right' or 'best', and, instead, develop governance models, frameworks and approaches that combine the steering role of states, markets and people [2] . Bottom-up decisions through deliberations amongst individuals, community/non-governmental organizations and social/family networks Many social and political scientists have taken these debates forward through studies of natural resource governance approaches. However, many governance analyses, particularly those from a common-pool resource (CPR) perspective, drawing on neo-institutional theories, remain primarily focused on the role of people and civil society in self-organising social-ecological systems e.g. Ostrom [3] , and resistant to the potential role of some degree and form of state coordination, control and/or regulation. This is consistent with Kjaer's [4] observation that whilst governance analyses should consider the role of the government and state steer, since the 1980s governance has increasingly been considered by many analysts as being distinct from government in its focus on people and civil society. The research upon which this paper is based aims to move these debates forward through analyses of MPA case studies that are based less on theories and underpinning ideals, and more on the realities of such case studies, including an acceptance of the potential contribution of the state towards addressing the many challenges raised by MPAs in effectively achieving strategic conservation objectives [5] .
Collaborative management (hereafter co-management) is a common concept or narrative that is employed in natural resource and protected area governance, whereby local communities and the state work on a partnership basis to sustainably manage natural resource use and/or conserve biodiversity, potentially involving all three of the governance approaches listed above. However, co-management arguably simply serves as a new framing device as to the relative emphasis that should be placed on the three approaches, rather than representing an answer to these debates.
MPAs are an important focus for debates concerning how these different approaches can be combined in co-management. It is widely accepted that co-managing MPAs is the way forward, but there are many different interpretations of this concept and it is applied in many different ways amongst MPAs in different contexts. One way of considering the challenges of comanaging MPAs is to consider the question: what does the recommendation that the "design and management of MPAs must be both top-down and bottom-up" [6] actually mean in practice?
The research upon which this paper draws was conceived to address this question by examining how different governance approaches are combined, through a detailed analysis of a range of MPA case studies. In examining the relative roles of top-down, bottom-up and market approaches to governance in these case studies, this project sought to explore the proposition that these approaches are applicable to different challenges in different contexts, and hence a combination of governance approaches is necessary to effectively achieve strategic conservation objectives.
The initial proposal for this project was circulated amongst the membership of the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA), and a pre-conference workshop was held at the second International Marine Protected Area Congress (IMPAC2) in Washington, DC in May 2009. Prior to the workshop, a governance analysis framework was developed as a proposal for analysing the case studies. This framework (discussed in more detail below) was subsequently refined, both in the light of discussions at the workshop and of feedback received from international MPA practitioners. During 2009-2010, project participants utilised the framework to analyse governance approaches in their case study MPAs, and in October 2010 a case study workshop was held in Lošinj, Croatia, hosted by the Blue World Institute and supported by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). This workshop focused on case study presentations based on applying the analytical framework, and a resulting UNEP technical report based on these analyses was published in 2011 [2] .
The MPA Governance Empirical Framework
This study was developed as a means of systematically analysing and comparing MPA governance in a representative range of case studies from around the world, with a view to identifying 'good practice' and assessing its transferability to other MPAs in comparable contexts. A framework for analysing MPA governance was initially developed by the first author, subject to subsequent refinements in discussion with the other authors, coupled with a review of related literature, including MPA case studies. The framework was further refined and adapted through discussions with MPAG project participants, as described above. The MPA governance analysis framework represents a realist institutional analysis approach. It is realist in that it is designed to collect information and empirically examine case studies in different contexts. It is institutional in that it builds on neo-institutional theories and case studies. Ostrom [7] broadly defines institutions as "prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions, including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales". We draw on this definition, considering institutions in similarly broad terms as covering a wide range of agreements, interactions, etc., which remain relatively stable over a period of time, including mutually agreed modes of cooperative behavior (norms); interactions through markets (local -distant); government policies and programs; and legal instruments and related obligations.
Certain institutions designed to achieve specific outcomes can be considered as incentives. The analytical framework for this project is based on the concept of such incentives, defined within this context as "institutions that are instrumentally designed to encourage people to choose to behave in a manner that provides for certain strategic policy outcomes, particularly biodiversity conservation objectives, to be fulfilled" [2] . Of course, there are incentives that may encourage people to behave in a manner that undermines the fulfilment of conservation objectives. These could be considered in terms of 'disincentives', but for the purposes of this analysis, the directionality of which is explicitly aligned towards the fulfilment of conservation objectives, such disincentives are discussed in terms of the driving forces that incentives designed to support MPAs must address and withstand [8] . The incentives for MPA governance employed in this analysis were divided into five categories (economic, interpretative, knowledge, legal, and participative) that can be related to the three modes of governance, as outlined in Table 2 . It is worth noting that the incentive categories are listed in alphabetical order, i.e. this order does not represent any ranking.
Case study participants examined how different incentives were used and combined to support the effective governance of their MPA, and which particular incentives were needed to make the governance approach more effective. The MPAG framework included several individual incentive types within each category i.e., ten types of economic incentives, four interpretative, five knowledge, eight legal, and six participative. Accordingly, participants assessed their case study MPA employing 33 types of incentives from five categories.
These incentives were assessed in the context of a wider governance analytical framework (Supplementary Material) which was applied to each case study. This provided a structured approach to gathering information on the context of each case study, including certain key socioeconomic metrics, the objectives of the MPA in question, the main drivers and conflicts that need to be addressed, the governance approach, and the effectiveness of the MPA governance approach in terms of fulfilling the MPA's objectives. It is important to recognise that, for the purposes of this MPA governance analysis, effectiveness in achieving the conservation objectives for the MPA was 'the bottom line', i.e. governance processes were evaluated in terms of whether they are effective in achieving conservation outcomes, though other elements of governance, such as equity and stewardship, are also considered as key contributors to effectiveness and included in case study discussions. 
Bottom-up (people steer)
Whilst this MPA governance analytical framework includes issues related to participation, equity, etc., it is important to recognise that these analyses were based on the expert views of the contributors to this study, rather than on wider socio-economic studies. The contributors to these case studies included MPA managers and related academic researchers, all of whom had a deep understanding of governance issues in their case studies. Their views may not, however, represent the views of other experts on these case studies or of people who are affected by a given MPA.
Introduction to the Case Studies
The fifteen case study papers in this special issue are drawn from the total of twenty case studies from around the world (Figure 1 ) analysed in the MPAG report [2] . They provide examples from a range of governance approaches and contexts, which are discussed further in the following paper [8] . They were both purposively selected, in that certain MPAs considered to be key examples were approached and invited to participate, and self-selected, in that some case studies were proposed to us following the circulation of the initial proposal for this study through the IUCN WCPA and the workshop at IMPAC2. The findings of the analyses of all 20 case studies are discussed in the following paper, and then all but five of these are presented in the 15 case study papers that follow in this special issue. Those case studies that are not included as papers in this special issue are based on the analyses reported in volume 2 of the MPAG technical report [2] . 
OBJECTIVES
Briefly describe the MPA's objectives in relation to the legislative obligations/framework under which it was designated.
DRIVERS/CONFLICTS
What are the main activities that need regulating to achieve the MPA's objectives? e.g. commercial and recreational fishing, tourism, inflowing pollution. What are the trends in these activities and what forces are driving these trends? e.g. incoming fishers, global fish markets, incoming corporate tourism, rising human populations through immigration, intensification of surrounding agriculture / industry, etc.
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK/APPROACH
Describe the governance structure / approach, including examples/stories that illustrate how this is (or is not) effective in addressing the conflicts and fulfilling the biodiversity and resource conservation objectives of the MPA. 
EFFECTIVENESS
Discuss whether the management objectives are being fulfilled, particularly the biodiversity and sustainable resource exploitation objectives. Please give your assessment of:
 The proportion of impacts that are being addressed (or not)  The degree to which they are being addressed (or not) This is focused on the effectiveness of the MPA governance incentives in addressing impacts from surrounding uses and local and incoming users, recognizing that this enhances ecosystem resilience to wide-scale impacts that are beyond the control of individual MPAs, particularly those related to climate change (e.g. increases in seawater temperature, ocean acidification and sea level rise).
0 No use impacts addressed; designation may even have increased impacts by undermining previous institutions.
1 Some impacts beginning to be slightly addressed.
2 Some impacts partly addressed but some impacts not yet addressed.
3 Some impacts completely addressed, some are partly addressed.
4 Most impacts addressed but some not completely.
5 All impacts from local activities completely addressed.
Please give your assessment / judgment of:
 where your MPA case study currently is on this scale;
 what effect the MPA designation and related governance incentives have had on effectiveness by addressing use impacts;
 the direction that MPA effectiveness is going: recovering (+), declining (-) or stable This effectiveness assessment captures what can also be considered in terms of implementation and management, but the focus of this analysis is on the effectiveness of particular or combinations of governance incentives.
INCENTIVES
Summarize the key incentives (employing the five categories) for effective governance, including how you think particular individual or combinations of incentives have been particularly effective. Also discuss how you think governance could be improved to better meet the conservation objectives through improved individual or combinations of incentives. Please refer to the list of incentives below, including some suggestions as to other incentives this section might also include.
KEY ISSUES
Outline what you think the key governance issues and questions are in relation to this case study. This should draw the analysis together in terms of the current effectiveness of the governance
